{"path":"research/prime-real-estate-words.md","content":"# Prime real estate: words people want, and what that changes for the concept layer\n\n**Date**: 2026-10-07 · **Type**: a founder observation, read against the corpus and against outside\nwork found online the same day (what was read, and how far, is in § 7).\n**Status**: his observation is recorded in his words. **The four proposals of § 5 are RULED\n2026-10-07** (ledger AC1 to AC4), founder, the same afternoon: ***\"Blessing all proposals in the\nwanted-words walkthrough.\"*** He added one comment, that nobody owns a wanted word, which corrected\nthree wordings here (§ 3a). The rest of the reading is Claude's. Nothing here is built.\n\nHe sent a thread from his own feed with these words: ***\"This stuff is important to keep in mind\nfor concept tracking and definitional moves/fighting. Some words are \"prime real estate\" in others'\nminds...\"***\n\n## 0. The short version\n\n- **A word can be wanted.** Some words carry a standing that passes to whatever they are applied\n  to: *magic, God, love, freedom, natural, science, conscious*. Others carry a rebuke: *cult,\n  pseudoscience, racist*. He calls the first kind prime real estate.\n- **How much a word is wanted is a second property, separate from how much of its meaning people\n  share.** The concept layer (the part of the graph that tracks contested words) records only the\n  second.\n- **A definition of a wanted word is a claim on it.** People fight over the word, and decline a\n  second word, because the standing cannot be moved to a new word by saying so.\n- **Three changes follow, all ruled the same day and unbuilt**: record the standing beside the\n  senses and say for whom; store a move on a wanted word as somebody's claim, with its kind; and\n  when two people want one word, keep the word on both senses with their names instead of handing\n  out two new words. A fourth adds one question to the test our own headlines must pass.\n- **Nobody owns a wanted word** (his comment on blessing them). People claim it. What it means is\n  settled by how others go on using it, and no speaker has the power to settle that alone (§ 3a).\n\n## 1. What he said\n\nThe thread is a friend's post that reclaims the word *magic* and says what she means by it. The\npost is friends-only, so it is described here no further than that; his comment under it is his\nown:\n\n> Det är lustigt hur man kan tolka ord så olika beroende på vad man känner om dem. Hade jag skrivit\n> om magi hade det mest handlat om hur magi uppstår inom den verkliga värld vi lever i och genom den\n> och hur är den är magisk utan att vara oförståelig och att inte dyrka något mysteriskt med magin\n> eller jag vet inte... Ordet magi är liksom Gud en utmärkt projektionsyta, men det finns ingen\n> konsensus om vad det betyder eller hur vi ska förstå det.\n\nIn English (my translation): *It is funny how differently one can read words depending on what one\nfeels about them. Had I written about magic it would mostly have been about how magic arises within\nthe real world we live in, and through it, and how it is magical without being incomprehensible,\nand about not worshipping something mysterious in the magic, or I don't know... The word magic is,\nlike God, an excellent projection surface, but there is no consensus on what it means or how we\nshould understand it.*\n\nFour things are in it, and they are separable.\n\n1. **The feeling comes first.** How a word is read depends on *\"vad man känner om dem\"*, what one\n   feels about it. The content is fitted to the feeling.\n2. **A kind of word is named**: a *projektionsyta*, a surface people project onto. Strong pull, no\n   agreed content.\n3. **The kind is named by its clearest member**: *\"liksom Gud\"*, like God.\n4. **He does not dispute her use.** He says what he would have meant. That is the form the corpus\n   already asks for, a person's own difference stated beside the other's\n   ([core-periphery-and-the-concept-layer.md](core-periphery-and-the-concept-layer.md) § 5b), done\n   unprompted and on the hardest kind of word.\n\n### 1a. What followed in the thread\n\nAdded the same afternoon, from a third screenshot he sent, asking that the author's reply be\nnoted. (His four words name her, so they are in the private note and not here.) Two replies had\ncome under his comment. Neither writer is named or quoted here.\n\n- **A third person answered him with a claim about the world.** His comment ends on there being no\n  consensus about what the word *means*. The reply says a consensus is forming about the *things*\n  the word has been used for, and points him to a scientist's account. One word, *consensus*, is\n  used for agreement on a meaning and for agreement on a finding. The two sentences read as opposed\n  and are about different questions.\n- **The post's author answered with the question itself, and asked it of everyone**: what do *we*\n  mean when we say the word. She added that the same goes for a second word, *energy*.\n\nThree things in that, for this document.\n\n1. **The move that claims no ground drew no defence of ground.** He had stated his own difference\n   and disputed nothing of hers (§ 4, the last row but one). The person whose use his differed from\n   took the question up as a shared one. This is one exchange between friends. It says nothing\n   about how the same move lands between opponents.\n2. **She extended the kind.** He had named the kind by one member, *like God*. She added another\n   unasked. The kind is one a reader can recognise and add to.\n3. ***Energy* is one word in two cells of the table in § 2, depending on who is asked.** Among\n   physicists it has an exact sense that nobody fights over. In the usage she points at it is a\n   projection surface. So where a word sits on *both* axes depends on the community, and the\n   table's vertical axis needs the *for whom* that § 5a asks for on the horizontal one.\n\n**What the screenshot cannot settle**: which of the two earlier comments her reply answers. Both\nreplies are in one thread under his comment, and hers names nobody.\n\n## 2. Two properties of a word, kept apart\n\n| | little standing rides on the word | much standing rides on the word |\n|---|---|---|\n| **most of its meaning is shared** | *penguin*, *thermostat*: nobody argues | *torture*, *marriage*, *planet*: the core is agreed and **the edge is fought over**, because what falls inside gets the standing |\n| **little of its meaning is shared** | *emergence*, *stakeholder*: vague, and a stated definition settles it | ***magic*, *God*, *freedom*, *natural***: the projection surface |\n\nEverything the concept layer has today sits on the vertical axis: whether a word's senses differ in\nwhat they refer to or in the standard they apply, and the lifecycle states built on that. **The\nhorizontal axis predicts something the vertical one cannot: whether offering two words will end the\nmatter.** On *emergence*, calling one sense *weak emergence* and the other *strong emergence* is\nwelcome. On *magic*, each person asked to take a different word has been asked to give up the thing\nthey came for.\n\nThe right-hand column has older names, each from a different field. Weaver (1953) called the top\nwords of a culture *god terms* and their opposites *devil terms*, and kept a third name,\n*charismatic terms*, for words such as *freedom* and *democracy* whose force no longer comes from\nanything they refer to. Lévi-Strauss (1950) called words of this kind *floating signifiers*, able\nto take whatever content is brought to them, and his case was *mana*, in an essay on Mauss's theory\nof **magic**. So the word in his comment is the original example in that literature. Gallie's first\ncondition for a concept that will be contested without end (1956) is that it is *appraisive*: it\ncredits whatever it is applied to with a valued achievement.\n\nTwo measured cases, so the bottom-right cell is not a matter of taste:\n\n- ***God.*** In a Pew survey of more than 4,700 American adults (December 2017), 80% said they\n  believe in God. Asked what they meant, 56% of all respondents meant God as described in the\n  Bible and a third meant some other higher power or spiritual force. One answer, at least two\n  things meant.\n- ***Democracy.*** Kirsch and Welzel (2019) report that stated support for democracy is as high in\n  autocracies as in democracies (0.81 against 0.82 on a scale from 0 to 1) and that many\n  respondents mean something authoritarian by the word. **A later study in six countries disagrees\n  about the content**: asked to judge described countries, people consistently treated elections\n  and civil liberties as what makes a country democratic. So for this word the standing is agreed\n  and how much of the content is shared is itself disputed between two measurements.\n\n## 3. Why the fight is over the word\n\nThree facts, each with a source.\n\n**The standing cannot be created by definition.** A writer can announce what a word will mean in\ntheir own text. How the word is felt cannot be announced: it is the residue of how the word has\nbeen used. (An earlier wording here said that what a word refers to *can be announced*. His comment\nof the same afternoon corrects it: for the word itself, the meaning is not a speaker's to set\neither; § 3a.) Stevenson (1938) separated the two\nas a word's *descriptive* and *emotive* meaning, and a later account in his line says outright that\nthe second *\"cannot just be stipulated\"* and can only be changed indirectly, by use. This is what\nmakes the founder's picture exact. The value sits at an address. People can lay claim to it, and\nit cannot be built somewhere else. (This sentence first said the address *can be occupied*. Nobody\nholds the deed: § 3a.)\n\n**The address is partly exclusive.** In one mind a word mostly holds one default sense. Ries and\nTrout built a theory of advertising on this, in the language of ownership that § 3a sets aside: the\nstrongest position, they say, is to *own* a word in the buyer's mind, and two companies cannot have\nthe same one. A recent philosophy manuscript (Miller)\ntreats what a word does as a resource that is at least partly rivalrous and treats a dispute over\nit as a negotiation whose cost varies. The founder's phrase *\"in others' minds\"* says where the\ncontest is: the worth of a word is its standing with an audience, and the audience is what no\nclaimant controls.\n\n**The standing passes to whatever the word is applied to.** Chalmers, whose test for a merely\nverbal dispute the corpus already uses, makes the exception himself: where words have fixed\nconnotations, *\"words have power that transcend these distinctions\"*, and what counts as *torture*\nis then a serious practical question. Cappelen (2018) gives the effect a name, *lexical effects*:\nwhat a word does to a hearer beyond what it means, with brand names as his plainest case. Plunkett\nand Sundell (2013) draw the consequence that matters most here: **a dispute about how a word should\nbe used can be a real disagreement and worth having**, even when both parties know all the facts.\n\n### 3a. Nobody owns it (his comment on blessing the proposals)\n\nVerbatim, 2026-10-07: ***\"Just one comment: nobody \"owns\" a wanted word. Everyone who wants it\nclaims it I guess, tries to claim it, but don't necessarily \"own\" its meaning, that's why/how it\nbecomes contested. And it's silly when people try to just redefine terms as they themselves see\nfit, as if they had that power, which is in actuality socially/culturally derived and there's no\nway around that.\"***\n\n**What it corrects here.** Three wordings in this document leaned toward possession: that what a\nword refers to *can be announced*, that the address *can be occupied*, and (§ 5e) that a reader\n*owns* a sense. All three are reworded and marked where they stood. His picture is this: the plot\nis wanted and nobody holds the deed. A definition is a bid. Whether it takes is decided by how\nother people go on using the word.\n\n**What it adds.** § 3 said the *standing* of a word cannot be set by a definition. His comment says\nthe same of the *meaning*. A speaker can say what they will mean by a word in their own text, and a\nreader can hold them to it. That is all a definition does by itself. The word's meaning is what a\ncommunity's use makes it. So the rule the graph needs is the one already ruled as proposal b: a\ndefinition of a wanted word is stored as somebody's claim on it, with a name and a date, and never\nas what the word means.\n\n**The example he pointed to**: ***\"Look up how Trump recently tried to redefine AI as SI\n(superintelligence) for a small example.\"*** Looked up the same afternoon. The White House's own\nfact sheet was read as fetched, the BBC's report most of the way, the rest as search extracts\n(§ 7).\n\n- **Early September 2026.** On his own platform the United States president called the term\n  *artificial intelligence* inaccurate, floated replacements, and put them to polls of his\n  followers. *Super intelligence* won (BBC; Deutsche Welle gives about 65 to 35 over *superior\n  intelligence*).\n- **22 September, at the United Nations General Assembly.** He said the word *artificial* makes the\n  technology sound fake, and that from then on all United States documents, and he hoped the\n  world's, would say *super intelligence*, SI for short. Then, of the new name: *\"Let's see if that\n  goes.\"* The renaming came in the same passage as a refusal of international control of the\n  technology (Defense One; Implicator). The State Department told its diplomats to use the new\n  term the same day (the Associated Press, as reported by the South China Morning Post).\n- **That week** he met China's president in Washington. China's foreign ministry said it respects\n  the American choice of term and did not say it would adopt it (South China Morning Post).\n- **29 September.** An executive order told every federal department to use *Super Intelligence*\n  and *SI* in correspondence, public communications and policy documents, to stop acknowledging\n  the old term, and told the president's science adviser to propose a federal definition of the new\n  one (the fact sheet).\n- **Uptake, as reported so far.** Officials switched at once. The leading laboratories have not\n  renamed their systems, and an executive standing beside him corrected himself in mid-sentence\n  (South China Morning Post). Researchers quoted by the BBC and Deutsche Welle expect it not to\n  spread, because *superintelligence* already names something else: a system far beyond human\n  ability, still hypothetical, since Bostrom's book of 2014.\n\n**What it shows.** It is the limit case of his comment: nobody has more power over a word than a\nhead of state with an executive order.\n\n1. **What an office can command is its own paper.** The order binds federal documents. For everyone\n   else he said he hoped. So the word now has one more sense, with a holder and a start date: in\n   United States government documents since 29 September 2026, *super intelligence* means what\n   *artificial intelligence* meant the week before. Proposal b stores exactly that, a move on a\n   word by a named party, of a named kind, dated. The graph can hold it without endorsing it and\n   without mocking it.\n2. **The word was adopted first and its definition ordered afterwards.** The same order that\n   requires the term asks an adviser to propose what it means. That is the plainest case in this\n   document of a word wanted for what rides on it.\n3. **The word he moved to was already in use.** It had a sense and a charge of its own, and both\n   came along. One act therefore makes two of § 4's moves: it swaps the word for a thing, to change\n   how the thing is felt, and it stretches a word that was taken over today's systems. A researcher\n   quoted by Deutsche Welle warned that the new name brings with it the fears attached to the old\n   sense.\n4. **One string, two senses, divided by community and by date.** *Leads in SI* now says one thing\n   in a federal document and another in a research paper. This is the *energy* case of § 1a with a\n   jurisdiction and a date on it. The concept layer has to keep both, each with whose it is.\n5. **The old word is needed to introduce the new one.** The fact sheet that tells agencies to stop\n   acknowledging *artificial intelligence* uses the term several times, to say what the new one\n   replaces, and applies the new term backwards to earlier years. A swap by order still has to\n   pass through the word it retires.\n\nHis reading of why it was done is in the private note. The reports give the timing, two days before\nthe meeting with China's president, and the BBC's report calls the purpose unclear.\n\n## 4. The moves\n\nWhat people do to a wanted word. The list is the thing he asked to have kept in mind.\n\n| Move | Keeps | Changes | Example |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **Persuasive definition** (Stevenson) | the standing | what the word covers | *real magic is…*, *true freedom is…* |\n| **Changing the standing** (Stevenson's quasi-definition) | what it covers | the standing | reclaiming *witch*; making *elite* a rebuke |\n| **Swapping the word** | the thing | the word, to get another standing | *untouchable* → *Harijan*; *estate tax* → *death tax*; *artificial intelligence* → *super intelligence*, by executive order (§ 3a) |\n| **Naming with it** | the word's standing | what the standing is attached to | a movement or product named *pro-life*, *rational*, *open* |\n| **Moving the edge** | the core | what falls inside | is it *torture*, is it a *marriage*, is Pluto a *planet* |\n| **Motte and bailey** | both senses, by turns | which one is in play | already in [the-motte-and-the-periphery.md](the-motte-and-the-periphery.md) |\n| **Barring the word** (Chalmers) | nothing | the word is set aside | *say it without the word* |\n| **Announcing a technical sense** | the word | the content, openly | works on *emergence*; on a wanted word it is the first move with a disclaimer |\n| **Stating one's own difference** | the other person's use | nothing of theirs | his comment: *had I written about magic…* |\n| **Asking what we mean** | everyone's use | nothing; the work of saying is shared | the post author's reply to him (§ 1a) |\n\nThe last two rows are the moves that claim no ground. The question claims none only when it is\nasked of everyone, the asker included. Put to one side alone, it is a way of stalling, and the\ncorpus already has the test for that: whether the burden of defining is carried by both\n([the-motte-and-the-periphery.md](the-motte-and-the-periphery.md), the third of its four tests).\nThe friend's post makes two of the others in\na few hundred words (it asks for the word's standing to change, and it says what she means by it),\nopenly and without hostility. So the list is not a list of tricks. **Most of these are ordinary and\nseveral are honest. What differs is whether the claim on the word is visible and has a name on\nit.**\n\n## 5. What it changes for Deliberus (a, b, c and e ruled 2026-10-07; nothing built)\n\nHis ruling covers the four proposals of the spoken walkthrough\n([the piece as rendered](../listening/2026-10-07-four-proposals-about-wanted-words.md)): a, b, c\nand e below. Paragraphs d and f propose nothing new.\n\n**a. Record the standing of a word beside its senses, and for whom.** *(Ruled.)* The same word is a word of\nhonour to one reader and a rebuke to another before either has said what it means, so the standing\nneeds a holder, as a sense does. A first reading costs nothing: published ratings of how pleasant\nand how arousing a word is exist for 13,915 English words (Warriner and colleagues, 2013, who also\nreport differences by gender, age and education). A second reading can be computed from the graph\nonce the clarification trail is stored: **a word is wanted when two senses are on record, both\nholders have been shown the difference, and neither has moved to another word.** (Ledger AC1.)\n\n**b. A move on a wanted word is stored as somebody's claim, with its kind.** *(Ruled.)* The corpus already\nsays a definition can be a report of usage, an argument, or a proposal\n([a-cut-through-a-concept-is-an-argument.md](a-cut-through-a-concept-is-an-argument.md) § 7), and\nthat a sense is somebody's difference of one of five kinds (covering more, covering less, a\ndifferent standard, a different threshold, a different weighting). **A sixth kind belongs on that\nlist: the same content with a different standing**, which is what reclaiming a word is. (AC2.)\n\n**c. Two answers to *what do you mean by X*, chosen by whether the word is wanted.** *(Ruled.)* On a word\nnobody wants, offer two names. On a wanted word, **keep the word on both senses with their\nholders' names** (the way biology writes a species name *according to* an author, already borrowed\nin [sameness-merge-and-split-across-fields.md](sameness-merge-and-split-across-fields.md)), and\nask Chalmers's question as a probe: *say it without the word; does anything still divide you?*\nWhen nothing does, the honest report is **that what divides them is who gets the word**. (The\nphrase names what the two are contending for. By § 3a neither ends up owning it: whose use the word\ncarries is settled, when it is, by everyone else's use.) That is a\nthird outcome beside *it was a confusion* and *they disagree about the world*, and today the graph\nwould file it with the first. The kind of horizon the corpus calls *definitional* (a disagreement\nthat continues among the word's users) therefore has two cases: one ends when the senses are\nshown, and one does not. His own earlier sentence saw the second case coming: *\"the conflict energy\nmight just move to the level of fighting over whose definition of a term is somehow most obviously\ncorrect\"* ([what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md](what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md) § 6c). (AC3.)\n\n**d. A sense label written by a model takes a side.** A model asked to name the senses of a wanted\nword writes the average reading, which is the majority's claim on it. The corpus has already\nproposed showing a sense by the uses people made of it and not by a label\n([store-the-uses-read-the-meaning.md](store-the-uses-read-the-meaning.md), ledger AA2). Wanted\nwords are the case where that proposal matters most. No new rule.\n\n**e. Our own wording.** *(Ruled.)* The project names its own things with wanted words: *truth*, *rational*,\n*wisdom*, *attunement*, *love*. One of the three tests every headline here must pass asks whether\na stranger would understand it. **A wanted word passes that test falsely**: every stranger is sure\nthey understood, and each understood their own sense. Ruled as a rider on that test, for the\nconstellation wall above all: ***is a key word in this line one that readers already bring a\nmeaning of their own to?*** (AC4. As proposed and as spoken in the walkthrough the question ended\n*one the reader already owns a sense of*; the word *owns* went out with § 3a, and the question asks\nthe same thing.) The rider now stands in the project's three headline tests.\n\n*A first pass over the wall, the same day.* A list of such words was run over all 45 tiles and the\nhits were read. The wall is mostly plain. Three of the fourteen ruled lines carry a word the rider\nwould ask about: *attunement* (a word of honour in some communities and unknown in others),\n*attacking* (an objection to a student of argument, aggression to many readers), and *fair* (used\nthere for *true to what you meant*, and a word with rival standards of its own). Two drafts rest on\nsuch words entirely: *Understanding is the infrastructure of love* and *Worldviews divide us. Our\nhearts mostly don't.* Nothing was changed. This is a model's guess at which words a reader already has a meaning for;\nonly a stranger's reading settles it, as with the test it rides on.\n\n**f. Last night's map is the worked case.** The map of the machine-consciousness exchange holds\nthree voices using *conscious* for different things (having information available, having an\nexperience, and a third party's use). Moral standing rides on the word: what is conscious is owed\nconsideration. That is why *access* against *experience* is argued as a claim on one word and is\nnot settled by keeping two. The map stored the word as two unrelated entries, one per text (ledger\nAB14), so today nothing in the graph can show that the fight is over one address.\n\n## 6. What this does not say\n\n- **It does not say wanting a word is a fault.** Cappelen calls those who use a word for its\n  effect *exploiters* and says the practice should be avoided. The position here differs: wanting a\n  word is ordinary, reclaiming one is often right, and what is owed is that the claim be visible\n  and attributed.\n- **It is not a label to put on other people's words.** *That is a loaded term* is itself a move.\n  The standing is recorded for a word and a group from ratings or from behaviour, the way a sense\n  is, and never as an accusation. The corpus refused a menu of bias labels for the same reason.\n- **It is not the sacred-values ruling again**, though the two touch: the name of something a\n  person holds sacred is the limit case of a wanted word, and asking them to define it goes deep at\n  once, so the rule that analysis owes attunement in proportion to depth applies.\n- **Limits of the evidence.** The word ratings are for English; Swedish ones were not looked for.\n  Differences in a word's standing between political camps are assumed here from the general\n  finding of group differences and were not checked. The claim that the standing cannot be\n  stipulated is a philosopher's, not a measurement.\n\n## 7. What was read, and how far\n\nFound and read online on 2026-10-07. **Verify before citing outward** wherever the reading was of\na summary.\n\n| Source | Read |\n|---|---|\n| [Chalmers, *Verbal Disputes*](https://consc.net/papers/verbal.pdf) (2011) | the passage quoted, from the paper's text |\n| [Plunkett & Sundell, *Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms*](https://www.plunkett.host.dartmouth.edu/disagreement-and-the-semant.pdf) (2013) | abstract and the passages defining the negotiation, from the paper |\n| Cappelen, *Fixing Language* (2018), ch. 11 | the chapter's abstract, and passages quoted in [Huetter-Almerigi 2022](https://exa.ai/library/publication/jg4swjd1bsh); the chapter itself not opened |\n| Miller, *Lexical Negotiations* (PhilPapers manuscript) | abstract and opening, from a library copy; no journal found |\n| Stevenson, *Persuasive Definitions* (1938) and *Ethics and Language* (1944) | through [Aberdein](https://philarchive.org/archive/ABERTT), Macagno & Walton, and Pruś & Aberdein; not opened |\n| [Gallie, *Essentially Contested Concepts*](https://cooperism.law.columbia.edu/files/2023/12/Gallie-Essentially-Contested-Concepts-1955-CL.pdf) (1956) | the list of conditions, from the paper |\n| Lévi-Strauss, *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss* (1950) | one passage as quoted in [a secondary paper](https://philarchive.org/archive/JENCAS-2), a second as quoted in the foreword to the English edition of Mauss's *A General Theory of Magic*, whose own fourth chapter has a section on *mana* (contents page read) |\n| Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (1953), last chapter | three secondary accounts that agree; not opened |\n| Ries & Trout, *The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing* (1993) | two summaries of the fifth and sixth laws; not opened |\n| [Pew Research Center, *When Americans Say They Believe in God…*](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/04/25/when-americans-say-they-believe-in-god-what-do-they-mean/) (2018) | the report's summary and its table |\n| Kirsch & Welzel, *Democracy Misunderstood* (Social Forces, 2019) | abstract and passages of the [working-paper version](https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/users_working_paper_15.pdf) |\n| [The six-country study](https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:991eed92-6b53-4811-b2e2-79388270d6d4/files/swm117r455) | its discussion section, from a repository copy; authors and journal not confirmed |\n| [Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert](https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13428-012-0314-x) (2013) | abstract and method |\n\n**For § 3a**, found and read on 2026-10-07 (the example he pointed to):\n\n| Source | Read |\n|---|---|\n| [The White House, *Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Inaugurates The Era of Super Intelligence*](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/09/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-inaugurates-the-era-of-super-intelligence/) (29 September 2026) | the page as fetched, whole |\n| [BBC News, *Will Trump's AI rebrand to 'super intelligence' catch on?*](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqy4z9pv4w0po) (23 September 2026) | most of the article as fetched |\n| [South China Morning Post](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3368921/amid-many-thorny-issues-china-trump-pushes-rename-ai-superintelligence) (26 September) and [a second report](https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3369617/whats-name-why-trump-wants-rebrand-ai-super-intelligence) (2 October) | search extracts |\n| [Deutsche Welle](https://www.dw.com/en/is-us-president-donald-trump-right-to-rename-ai-as-super-intelligence/a-79430388) (30 September) | search extract |\n| [Defense One](https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2026/09/super-intelligence-presidents-new-term-ai-explained/416153/) (22 September), [Implicator](https://www.implicator.ai/trump-renames-ai-super-intelligence-at-un-and-rejects-global-control-efforts/) (23 September), [Fox Business](https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/trump-signs-executive-order-rebranding-ai-super-intelligence-tech-titans-ink-separate-accord) (29 September) | search extracts |\n\nThe executive order's own text was not opened; what it requires is taken from the fact sheet.\n\nThe friend's post and the thread are in the private source note, with her name and wording. So is\nhis message of the ruling in full.\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- [core-periphery-and-the-concept-layer.md](core-periphery-and-the-concept-layer.md) § 5b (a sense\n  is somebody's difference) and § 6 (design proposals this adds to)\n- [the-motte-and-the-periphery.md](the-motte-and-the-periphery.md) (one of the moves, read at\n  length)\n- [a-cut-through-a-concept-is-an-argument.md](a-cut-through-a-concept-is-an-argument.md) § 4 and\n  § 7 (definition as a move; report, argument or proposal)\n- [attunement-words-and-the-concept-layer.md](attunement-words-and-the-concept-layer.md) (*love*,\n  *understanding*: wanted words in the register the project itself is written in)\n- [what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md](what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md) § 6c (the definitional\n  horizon)\n- [mapping-the-machine-consciousness-debate.md](mapping-the-machine-consciousness-debate.md) § 5f\n  (one word, two entries)\n- [what-a-link-rests-on.md](what-a-link-rests-on.md) § 2e, § 4.5 (twelve of fifteen links between\n  the two consciousness texts rest on two names being one thing, and the names are wanted words:\n  a joining of names is somebody's claim on a word)\n- ledger: [session26-open-rulings.md](session26-open-rulings.md) Arc AC\n"}