{"path":"research/four-books-the-corpus-had-not-read.md","content":"# Four books the corpus had not read: a first reading\n\n**Date**: 2026-10-11 · **Type**: a first reading, from secondary sources, of four books named in a\nvideo the founder sent · **Status**: Claude's reading. Nothing here is ruled, and no ledger row is\nfiled from it yet (§ 6 says why).\n\n**His words**, 2026-10-11, sending Stephen Petro's video *These 12 Books Will Permanently Change What\nYour Mind Is Capable Of*: *\"ingest this transcript (make sure it's totally accurate) and mine it for\ninsights relating to all aspects and domains and angles on Deliberus\"*. The transcript waits for the\nkeeper's machine, on his word: *\"We can just wait and do this from my Mac Mini instead if it could\nsomehow change the game for getting a good transcript. Feels very important to get it right\"*. Then,\non this note: *\"But yes do feel free to research the missing books on a rudimentary level first.\"*\n\n**The full reading followed the same day**:\n[twelve-books-read-against-deliberus.md](twelve-books-read-against-deliberus.md), from the exact\ntranscript. It confirms the four lines in the table below, adds what each of these four bears on, reads\nthe other eight, and carries this note's six candidates in its § 16. One statement here was wrong: Ashby\nwas not in the corpus (the one *Ashby* found is another researcher), and Lakoff is named only in\npassing.\n\n**Which four.** Of the twelve books, eight are already in the corpus by name: Toulmin, Lakatos,\nHofstadter and Sander, Mercier and Sperber, Scott, Gigerenzer (a little), Lakoff and Ashby (once\neach). Four had never been cited, and a search of `docs/` and `specs/` for each author and each\nbook's central idea found none:\n\n| | Book | What the video takes from it, in one line |\n|---|---|---|\n| 1 | Stephen Ziliak and Deirdre McCloskey, *The Cult of Statistical Significance* (2008) | when a result is called significant, ask how large the effect is, how uncertain, and whether that size matters here |\n| 2 | James Woodward, *Making Things Happen* (2003) | understand a cause by asking what would happen to one thing if another were changed with the rest held fixed |\n| 3 | L. A. Paul, *Transformative Experience* (2014) | some choices change who chooses, so ask what this choice may turn you into |\n| 4 | François Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy* (French 1996, English 2004) | instead of designing an outcome and imposing it, read the situation and change its conditions until the outcome comes easily |\n\n**How far each was read.** None of the books. For each: the publisher's page or an encyclopedia\nentry, one to three reviews, and the strongest critic found. Where a detail comes from memory it is\nmarked *(recalled)*; where it comes only from someone else's summary it says whose. The video's lines\nabove are paraphrased from YouTube's automatic captions, which mishear the names (the eleventh title\ncame out as *efficiency*), and will be checked against the exact transcript.\n\n---\n\n## 0. In short\n\n- **Ziliak and McCloskey** find a gap in our scheme set: no critical question in any scheme asks how\n  large an effect is (`deliberus/extraction/schemes.py`, checked). The size is stored on a claim and\n  read by the synthesis prompt, and no strength reads it. And *significant* is a word with two senses,\n  which is the concept layer's own kind of problem.\n- **Woodward** supplies the theory behind two open proposals: a rule's breadth set by which changes of\n  the case a step survives (AD25), and questions about whether a finding carries over (Q11). His\n  *invariance comes in degrees* is the same test under another name. He also names exactly what the\n  hinge score measures: what the computed conclusion depends on, not what causes what.\n- **Paul** argues, from decision theory, for the line the founder ratified on 2026-08-25: *the\n  experience itself is the person's alone; its causes, counterfactuals and satisfiers are mappable\n  territory*. She adds one thing the traversal library lacks: whoever reports a crossing has crossed,\n  and may value it differently for that reason.\n- **Jullien** describes how this project already tries to act in the world (cheap persistence,\n  position before the avalanche). His own last chapters then show where that way of acting turns\n  into manipulation, and Deliberus is built against that turn.\n\n---\n\n## 1. Ziliak and McCloskey, *The Cult of Statistical Significance*\n\n**What it argues.** Statistical significance says how surely an effect differs from zero, not how\nlarge or how important it is. A field that publishes on significance alone becomes what the authors\ncall *sizeless*. Their evidence is two surveys of the *American Economic Review*:\n\n- **1996**, in the *Journal of Economic Literature*: of 182 papers from the 1980s that used\n  regression, 70% did not distinguish economic from statistical significance, judged against 19\n  criteria.\n- **2004** (*Size Matters*, in the *Journal of Socio-Economics*): of 137 papers from the 1990s, 82%\n  took a merely significant finding for an important one, and 81% treated the sign of a coefficient\n  as enough, ignoring its size.\n\nA review in *Times Higher Education* says the book credits W. S. Gosset (\"Student\") with a rigorous\nsense of what significance means in research meant to inform policy.\n\n**What its critics say.** Kevin Hoover and Mark Siegler (*Sound and fury*, 2008) call the\ndistinction itself *\"jejune and uncontroversial\"*. They argue that the charge of confusion rests on\ninaccurate readings of the papers surveyed, and that tests used properly gauge signal strength and\nhelp specify models and find causal structure. Andrew Gelman's comment on the exchange is that a null\nof exactly zero is almost never true, so a test is best read as a measure of uncertainty. Both\ncritiques narrow the book and do not reverse it: report size and uncertainty together, and do not\nthrow the test away.\n\n**Where it touches Deliberus.**\n\n- **No question asks the size.** The causal schemes ask about confounders, temporal order,\n  dose-response, alternative causes and a plausible mechanism. None asks whether the effect is large\n  enough to bear on the conclusion as stated. The nearest is the sign scheme's *\"strong enough to be\n  reliable\"*, which is about reliability, not size.\n- **The size is stored and weighs nothing.** Extraction stores `effect_size` on a claim when a source\n  gives one, and `truth_graph.py` hands it to the synthesis prompt. No strength reads it: the\n  methodology tier sets a link's starting weight (`graph/qbaf.py`). That is the same finding the\n  topic index already records for `heterogeneity` and `study_count`.\n- ***Significant* has two senses.** One is technical: reliably different from zero. One is ordinary:\n  important. A claim extracted from *\"a significant link between X and Y\"* that reads *X strongly\n  affects Y* has moved from the first to the second, and the move is an amplification. Our\n  instruments measure collapse better than amplification\n  ([the-scrutiny-gap.md](the-scrutiny-gap.md)). It is also the concept layer's own case: a word whose\n  defensible sense and persuasive sense come apart ([the-motte-and-the-periphery.md](the-motte-and-the-periphery.md)).\n- **Our own reporting.** Two rulings already take the decision-minded side. The level a pass must\n  reach is set by what a wrong answer does\n  ([pass-quality-and-the-choice-of-model.md](pass-quality-and-the-choice-of-model.md)), and a pass\n  called proven gives its bound and scope (ledger T8). The habit is uneven: many of our pass figures\n  are small counts (12 of 12, 24 of 26) given without the uncertainty of a count that small. Some\n  notes do state it (*zero disagreements in forty bounds the true rate near 7%*, in the Jev note).\n\n---\n\n## 2. Woodward, *Making Things Happen*\n\n**What it argues.** Woodward takes an *intervention* as the basic notion. X causes Y if some\nintervention that changes X, and touches Y by no other route, would change Y. X is a *direct* cause\nif Y changes when the other variables are held fixed by separate interventions. The account does not\nreduce causation to something non-causal, and does not need the interventions to be performed: it\nsays what a causal claim means, not how to test it. A generalisation explains to the\ndegree that it is *invariant*, holding across a range of interventions. Invariance comes in degrees:\na generalisation can have exceptions and still hold over some range. Hitchcock and Woodward argue\nthat an explanation is deeper when the generalisation it uses holds over a wider range. The phrase\nthat causal explanation answers *what-if-things-had-been-different* questions is Woodward's\n*(recalled)*. The formal sibling is Pearl's `do` operator, where changing X by intervention can\ndiffer from merely observing it.\n\n**What its critics say.** The encyclopedia entry on causation and manipulability (revised 2023)\nrecords the first three objections below; the fourth comes from an abstract of Woodward's reply:\n\n- **Circularity.** An intervention is itself causal. The reply: the account is non-reductive by\n  design, and not viciously circular, since one can learn one causal fact from an experiment without\n  already knowing it.\n- **Unmanipulable variables**, such as race, sex or species. Some statisticians and epidemiologists\n  call these claims ill-defined.\n- **Truth conditions.** Critics want counterfactuals grounded in laws.\n- **Relativity.** Strevens argues that the account makes causal facts relative to a perspective;\n  Woodward answers that a relativised cause is still a cause.\n\n**Where it touches Deliberus.**\n\n- **Two open proposals get their theory.** AD25 sets a rule's breadth by *\"asking which changes of\n  the case the step survives\"*, and lists the same problem in five fields. Woodward's range of\n  invariance is a sixth, from the philosophy of science. Hitchcock and Woodward's claim, that a wider\n  range gives a deeper explanation, is outside support for the measured finding that a wider rule is\n  not a step down ([quality-control-for-deeper-steps.md](quality-control-for-deeper-steps.md)). And\n  Q11 asks that a generalising inference carry questions about whether a finding carries over, which\n  is invariance asked of a population or a setting. The evidence note already holds Russo and\n  Williamson's *difference-making* evidence ([what-counts-as-evidence.md](what-counts-as-evidence.md));\n  Woodward is the account of what difference-making is.\n- **What the hinge measures.** `hinge.py` clamps a claim's strength to 1 and to 0, recomputes, and\n  records how far the root moves. That is an intervention, but on the strength model, not on the\n  world. It names what a computed conclusion depends on; it never says that one claim causes\n  another. Worth one sentence wherever the hinge is explained to a reader.\n- **Learning and making are different conditionals.** Ledger W3 proposes storing each link's\n  *P(C | P)* and *P(C | not P)*. A model asked those questions reads them as *if I learned P*, which\n  is the right reading for whether one claim is a reason for another. For a causal claim inside the\n  graph, the question is *if P were made true*, and the two come apart wherever a common cause sits\n  behind both. The video's own example (teenagers, social media, anxiety) is one. A note for W3, to\n  check in the full reading.\n- **A clarifying move.** Many causal disputes are disputes over which change is meant: *raising the\n  minimum wage* by how much, where, starting from what. *What change do you have in mind?* asks for\n  substance, not ontology, so it fits the clarification directive. The minimum-wage pair from dogfood\n  run 2 is the place to try it.\n\n---\n\n## 3. Paul, *Transformative Experience*\n\n**What it argues.** Some experiences teach what cannot be learned any other way: you cannot know\nwhat it is like until you have it (*epistemically* transformative). Some change what you value\n(*personally* transformative). When a choice is both, as Paul argues becoming a parent is, the\nstandard advice cannot be followed: imagine each outcome, value it, choose. You cannot supply the\nvalue of what it will be like, and the self who would live with the outcome may value it differently\nfrom the self choosing. Testimony does not close the gap. Her opening case is an offer to become a\nvampire: the vampires can describe their lives, but their advice is shaped by an irreversible choice\nand by the preferences it gave them. Her answer recasts the decision: weigh the value of discovering\nwho you would become (*revelation*) against the value of staying as you are.\n\n**What its critics say** (as summarised in the book's encyclopedia entry):\n\n- **Richard Pettigrew** (*Mind*): uncertain subjective probabilities can be assigned rationally, so\n  the decision is less blocked than Paul says. His later book on choosing for changing selves is\n  *(recalled)*.\n- **Krister Bykvist**: parts of a new experience can be compared with known ones, so the problem is\n  real only for a narrow class of cases.\n- **Amia Srinivasan**: the deeper question is ethical, not about rationality.\n- **David Brooks**: *revelation* puts personal desire before moral growth.\n- **Paul Bloom**: the same limit applies to how we imagine other people, not only our future selves.\n- **Tania Lombrozo**: parents are more likely than non-parents to value parenthood.\n\n**Where it touches Deliberus.**\n\n- **It argues for a ratified line.** *\"The experience itself is the person's alone; its causes,\n  counterfactuals and satisfiers are mappable territory where anyone, including the experiencer, can\n  be wrong\"* (ratified 2026-08-25, [parity-and-the-zone-interior.md](parity-and-the-zone-interior.md)).\n  Paul draws the same boundary from decision theory: what it is like cannot be passed on, while\n  outcomes, causes and the facts around them can. Her claim is about the future self; the line is\n  about the present one. The open challenge to the line's *incorrigible* (ledger Q14, from\n  Schwitzgebel) is untouched by her.\n- **The traversal library needs one more field.** The founder ruled that one person's mapped\n  crossing of a hard choice should inform the next person facing it, with attribution as the\n  requirement (*which reasons and values weigh more for whom*). Paul's vampires say what that library\n  will contain: reports by people who crossed, whose preferences may have changed with the crossing.\n  So a report should say whether its author has made the choice it describes and lived with it.\n  Lombrozo's observation is the reason. This is the same kind of provenance as *audience*, which the\n  motte note found missing ([the-motte-and-the-periphery.md](the-motte-and-the-periphery.md) § 3c).\n  It narrows the library; it does not argue against it. A reader has already narrowed the ruling once\n  from the other side: weights are constructed when they are asked for (`scripts/corpus_graph.py\n  around parity-and-the-zone-interior`).\n- **The same case, two answers.** The parity note was written while the founder listened to Ruth\n  Chang on whether to have children, which is Paul's flagship case. Chang's answer is to commit and so\n  create reasons; Paul's is to choose for the discovery. Both sit in the permissive zone, and the\n  library can hold each as an attributed way of crossing. It does not have to choose between them.\n- **A boundary for the founding conviction, to put to him.** *Opacity is a cost, not a mystery*\n  carries the guard that it must contain attunement and never price it away. Bloom's extension of\n  Paul gives the guard an argument: one part of another person's position (what their experience is\n  like) is not lowered by any description, and co-presence (P21) or attunement may be the only route\n  to it. Whether to say this in the conviction's own words is his call.\n\n---\n\n## 4. Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy*\n\n**What it argues.** The book's chapters run from *Fixing One's Eyes on a Model* through *Relying on\nthe Propensity of Things*, *Action or Transformation*, *Do Nothing (with Nothing Left Undone)* and\n*Allow Effects to Come About*, to *The Logic of Manipulation*, *Manipulation versus Persuasion* and\n*In Praise of Facility*. On the Western side (Aristotle, Machiavelli, Clausewitz):\n\n- set up an ideal form, take it as the goal, act to make it fact;\n- the model is projected onto a situation treated as *\"momentarily 'frozen'\"*;\n- practice keeps failing the theory, and Clausewitz is left with friction and luck.\n\nOn the Chinese side (Sunzi, the Laozi, Han Feizi, the Guiguzi):\n\n- read the configuration and the potential it carries (*shi*, which Jullien renders *propensity*);\n- let effects come about as consequences rather than aims;\n- treat a situation *\"as a disposition that is known to be constantly evolving\"* (p. 189, quoted in\n  Henkel's review).\n\nThe potential cannot be foreseen, only detected as it changes, so prediction gives way to continuous\nreading. The maxim his commentators quote: victorious troops win first and then give battle. That\nJullien tells the story of the farmer who pulled up his sprouts to help them grow is *(recalled)*,\nnot checked.\n\n**His own last chapters name the cost.** Applied to people, efficacy by propensity is manipulation.\nA chapter-by-chapter French summary hosted by the École de Guerre Économique gives the following for\nchapters 9 and 10 (translated here; to be checked against the book):\n\n- **The definition** (p. 171 of the French edition): to manipulate someone is to bring them to want,\n  of themselves, what I want them to do and foresee will harm them, while they believe it serves\n  them.\n- **Against persuasion**: rhetoric loses its value, because persuading someone costs effort and is\n  never assured, while influence applied before they have formed a view is cheaper.\n- **What speech is for**: only to open and close, to sound the other out.\n- **The asymmetry**, quoted in the summary: *\"the other is made transparent while I make myself\n  opaque\"*.\n\n**What its critics say.** Jean François Billeter (*Contre François Jullien*, 2006) argues that the\n*Chinese thought* Jullien contrasts with *Western thought* is a myth with a political history. It\npasses from the Han court through the Jesuits and Voltaire to French sinology. Its \"thought of\nimmanence\" belongs, he writes (translated here), to a world where *\"the question of ends cannot be discussed, nor even\nposed\"*, so intelligence is confined to *\"means, methods, manoeuvres and the art of adapting to what\nis\"*, a world *\"congenitally linked to the imperial order\"*. The real contrast, Billeter says, is\nbetween imperial despotism and the democratic principle, not between China and the West. Henry Zhao\n(*New Left Review*, 2007) calls the interpretation *\"very free\"*, and *shi* notoriously ambiguous.\nChristiaan Mitchell's sympathetic review (2005) concedes that the book does not escape generalising\nabout *the East* and *the West*.\n\n**Where it touches Deliberus.**\n\n- **How the project acts in the world.** The success prior's fifth consequence (cheap persistence\n  through the flat phase; position before the avalanche beats pushing during it;\n  [fractal-priors-for-success.md](fractal-priors-for-success.md) § 13) is Jullien's efficacy in other\n  words. So are courting the carriers and preparing the status flip without depending on it, and the\n  founder's own phrase for the sessions: to *\"nudge a little bit closer\"* every day\n  ([what-deliberus-is-for.md](what-deliberus-is-for.md)). It also fits the daemon rule (a daemon\n  changes the rate of a move a person would make, never the equilibrium) and the inversion principle\n  (structure is output, so set the conditions in which contributing is easy, Jullien's *facility*).\n  **The caveat stands at full weight**: a reader found that § 13 read alone cannot lose, and the\n  corpus refuses such accounting for the wager. Jullien gives the stance a frame and no evidence. An\n  analogy may organise and never justify, as the islands-of-coherence note says of its own metaphor.\n- **How the product treats a person: the opposite.** Jullien's chapter 10 is a precise description\n  of what Deliberus is built against. The convergence illusion and the DeepMind result are\n  manipulation in his sense: influence before anyone has formed a view, with participants preferring\n  the facilitator that steered them. The design answers in the other key, persuasion in the open:\n  show structure, ask questions, never restate their words, and make a lean attributable. His\n  asymmetry (*the other transparent, I opaque*) is the exact inverse of *minds make each other\n  legible*. It gives a question worth asking of any surface that learns about people: **does this\n  make the person more transparent to us than we are to them?** It would meet one ruling directly:\n  the read log is visible to the keeper only (2026-09-27, *\"Read log should only be visible to me\"*).\n  That ruling is about which other people may see a reader's record, not about whether readers may\n  see their own. Whether readers should see their own record is open, and his to decide.\n- **Billeter's point is ours as well.** A practice confined to means, with the question of ends\n  closed, is the shape of *if I don't, someone else will* (ledger U10, a belief that helps choose the\n  game). The descent exists to keep ends discussable: it reaches the value premises and keeps the\n  weighing open. So the two books read together say: take facility for how the project behaves, and\n  refuse the closure of ends in what the product does. Scott, also on the list, is the same tension\n  from the other side. He praises the practical local knowledge a state's legibility destroys;\n  Billeter shows such adaptive cunning serving an empire, which is the corpus's capture rider (Porter)\n  in another key.\n\n---\n\n## 5. What the four have in common, and what the video adds\n\nThe video says a good book *\"should force your mind to perform an operation it could not perform\nbefore\"*, and it closes each book with questions to ask. That is the corpus's own test for a borrowed\nidea: **a borrowed category earns its place by yielding a move** (`what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md`\n§ 6b). Three of these four yield a question a scheme or a surface lacks today:\n\n- how large is the effect, and does that size bear on the conclusion (Ziliak and McCloskey);\n- would it still hold under the change in question, and which change is meant (Woodward);\n- has the person reporting this crossing already made it (Paul).\n\nJullien's yields a question for how we work, not for any argument scheme. The other eight books were\nnot read for this note, and the video's own reasons for each will be read from the exact transcript.\n\n---\n\n## 6. What is not done, and why no ledger rows yet\n\n- **Candidates, unruled, held back from the ledger**: a critical question on size; a check that\n  *significant* keeps its technical sense through extraction; Woodward named as the theory under AD25\n  and Q11; the hinge described as an intervention on the model; a crossing field on traversal reports;\n  the transparency question for surfaces that learn about people. Held because the ledger had 345 open\n  rows today against 266 at the start of 6 October, and because the exact transcript may change what\n  the video takes from each book. The full reading on the Mac decides which become rows.\n  **2026-10-11, after that reading**: the transcript changed none of the six. They are carried,\n  with thirteen more, in the full reading's § 16, and none is a row: he approved a plan in which\n  no candidate is filed without his word.\n- **To check against the books themselves**: the French summary of Jullien's chapters 9 and 10, the\n  farmer and the sprouts, Woodward's *what-if-things-had-been-different*, Pettigrew's later book.\n- **Not read at all**: the books. Every claim about their arguments here comes through the sources\n  below.\n\n## Sources\n\n- Times Higher Education, review of *The Cult of Statistical Significance*: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/node/82453\n- McCloskey and Ziliak (1996), *The Standard Error of Regressions*, *Journal of Economic Literature* 34(1): https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jeclit/v34y1996i1p97-114.html\n- Ziliak and McCloskey (2004), *Size Matters*, as summarised at https://econjwatch.org/articles/size-matters-the-standard-error-of-regressions-in-the-american-economic-review\n- Hoover and Siegler (2008), *Sound and fury: McCloskey and significance testing in economics*: https://public.econ.duke.edu/~kdh9/Source%20Materials/Research/Sound%20and%20Fury%20Published%20Version.pdf (abstract read through a search summary)\n- Gelman (2007) on the exchange: https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2007/10/05/significance_te/ (not fetched; read through a search summary)\n- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *Causation and Manipulability* (revised 2023): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani/\n- NDPR review of *Making Things Happen*: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/making-things-happen-a-theory-of-causal-explanation/\n- Hitchcock and Woodward, *Explanatory Generalizations, Part II*: https://www.joelvelasco.net/teaching/5330(fall2013)/hitchcock_woodward2.pdf (read through a search summary)\n- Woodward, *Interventionism Defended* (abstract): https://www.college-de-france.fr/en/agenda/symposium/causation-new-prospects/interventionism-defended-methodology-circularity-and-truth-conditions\n- Wikipedia, *Transformative Experience* (the book, with its reviews): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformative_Experience\n- Bykvist and Stefansson (2017), *Epistemic Transformation and Rational Choice*, *Economics and Philosophy*: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-and-philosophy/article/abs/div-classtitleepistemic-transformation-and-rational-choicediv/514166F7DDC379D678023A82928A54C8\n- University of Hawai'i Press, *A Treatise on Efficacy*: https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/title/a-treatise-on-efficacy-between-western-and-chinese-thinking/\n- Henkel (2006), review in *Philosophy East and West*: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/196017/summary\n- Mitchell (2005), review: https://exa.ai/library/publication/zgxr621jd19\n- Aligica, *Efficacy East and West: François Jullien's Explorations in Comparative Strategy*: https://aligica.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/7.-Efficacy-East-and-West.-Francois-Jullien%E2%80%99s-Explorations-in-Comparative-Strategy-PD-Aligica.pdf\n- *Stratégie indirecte et matrice culturelle chinoise* (a chapter-by-chapter French summary): https://www.ege.fr/sites/ege.fr/files/fichiers/traite_efficacite.pdf\n- Zhao (2007), *Contesting Confucius*, *New Left Review* 44: https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii44/articles/henry-zhao-contesting-confucius\n- Billeter (2006), *Contre François Jullien*, publisher's page and excerpt: https://www.editions-allia.com/fr/livre/456/allia@editions-allia.com · https://editions-allia.com/files/pdf_226_file.pdf · a review: https://www.questionchine.net/?id_article=1969&page=articlepdf\n\n## Cross-references\n\n[the-scrutiny-gap.md](the-scrutiny-gap.md) · [the-motte-and-the-periphery.md](the-motte-and-the-periphery.md) ·\n[what-counts-as-evidence.md](what-counts-as-evidence.md) · [pass-quality-and-the-choice-of-model.md](pass-quality-and-the-choice-of-model.md) ·\n[quality-control-for-deeper-steps.md](quality-control-for-deeper-steps.md) · [what-a-rule-rests-on.md](what-a-rule-rests-on.md) ·\n[parity-and-the-zone-interior.md](parity-and-the-zone-interior.md) · [decomposing-value.md](decomposing-value.md) (picking and choosing) ·\n[fractal-priors-for-success.md](fractal-priors-for-success.md) · [what-deliberus-is-for.md](what-deliberus-is-for.md) ·\n[schmachtenberger-and-the-ai-race.md](schmachtenberger-and-the-ai-race.md) · [what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md](what-belongs-in-the-ontology.md) ·\n[jev-and-the-judgement-layer.md](jev-and-the-judgement-layer.md)\n"}